Consider an economic model whose equilibrium can be represented as the …xed point of a system of di¤erentiable equations. Using the theory of B matrices, I show that comparative statics are well-behaved if the interactions between the equations are not too large, and the negative interactions are not too varied. When there are only positive interactions, for example when strategic complements prevail in a strategic setting, I prove a version of Samuleson's (1947) Correspondence Principle in that equilibrium is nondecreasing for any positive parameter shock if and only if equilibrium is exponentially stable under discrete time best reply dynamics. If there are only negative interactions, like when strategic substitutes prevail in a game theoretic context, I use the theory of inverse M matrices to signi…cantly relax Dixit's (1986) conditions under which comparative statics are well-behaved. For every comparative statics result I show that if the conditions apply globally then equilibrium is unique. Applications are provided to di¤erentiated products Cournot oligopoly, market demand with interdependent preferences, and games on …xed networks.
Introduction
In many economic models, the equilibrium values of endogenous variables can be characterized as the solution to a system of equations: Of paramount interest is the equilibrium e¤ect on the endogenous variables of a change in an exogenous parameter. Using recent results from linear algebra and the familiar Implicit Function Theorem approach, I provide novel results and insights on this canonical problem.
While the results apply to any system of equations, the intuition can be best understood in a game theoretic context where the system is interpreted as the set of best response functions, one for each player. The total equilibrium e¤ect of a positive shock on a player's action can be decomposed into a partial e¤ect and an interactions e¤ect. The partial e¤ect is the increase in the player's action holding constant all other player's actions. The interactions e¤ect is the di¤erence between the total e¤ect and partial e¤ect. If there are negative interaction e¤ects, meaning that there is a player whose best response is decreasing in the action of some other player, then the private e¤ect and interactions e¤ect may have opposite signs. Consequently, the total e¤ect and private e¤ect may have opposite signs as well.
Comparative statics are "well-behaved,"meaning that the total e¤ect and private e¤ect have the same sign, when interaction e¤ects are moderate and the negative interaction e¤ects are not too varied. Speci…cally, if the column (row) means of the Jacobian are positive and larger than each of its o¤-diagonal elements, I show that its inverse has nonnegative row (column) sums. This is su¢ cient for well-behaved comparative statics. The result builds o¤ of Carnicer, Goodman and Peña (1999) who show that these matrices, termed B matrices in Peña (2001) , have a strictly positive determinant. The class of B matrices is distinct from diagonally dominant matrices and appears to be new to the economics literature.
To put this result in context, Dixit (1986) studies comparative statics in a homogeneous products Cournot oligopoly with strategic substitutes. Demand depends only on the sum of output, so interaction is anonymous. Dixit shows that comparative statics are well-behaved under a diagonal dominance condition, which with anonymous interaction requires each of the o¤-diagonal terms in the (normalized) Jacobian to be less than 1 n 1 : My result demonstrates that, for a wider class of parameter shocks, well-behaved comparative statics arise under the same condition if either interaction is anonymous or there are strategic substitutes.
When strategic substitutes and anonymous interaction exist, I exploit the theory of inverse M matrices to show that Dixit's condition can be relaxed to 1 p n 2
: I also show that diagonal dominance is su¢ cient for well-behaved comparative statics with (non-anonymous) strategic substitutes.
When strategic complements prevail, so that all interaction e¤ects are positive, illbehaved comparative statics are possible with large interaction e¤ects. However, in accord with Samuelson's (1947) Correspondence Principle, equilibrium is nondecreasing for any positive shock if and only if equilibrium is exponentially stable. This is an Implicit Function Theorem-based version of Echenique's (2002) lattice-based result in which he shows that if the equilibrium is not monotone increasing then equilibrium is unstable. I also show that equilibrium is unique if the spectral radius of the normalized Jacobian is everywhere less than one.
More generally, for each result, if the conditions on the (normalized) Jacobian which guarantee well-behaved comparative statics apply globally then equilibrium is unique, if it exists. All but one of the comparative statics results involve conditions under which the Jacobian is a B matrix, an M matrix, or an inverse M matrix in equilibrium. Since each of these classes is a type of P matrix, Gale and Nikaido's (1965) global univalence result gives uniqueness if the Jacobian is everywhere a B matrix, an M matrix, or an inverse M matrix. The remaining comparative statics result (Theorem 5) requires a norm of the Jacobian to be less than one at equilibrium. If the norm is everywhere less than one, uniqueness follows from Lemma 3 in Christensen and Jung (2010) .
A unifying principal which emerges from the analysis is that heterogeneity matters. Well-behaved comparative statics arise at stable equilibria when interaction e¤ects are not too varied. But if there are at least some negative interaction e¤ects, and interaction e¤ects are su¢ ciently heterogeneous, then even at stable equilibria comparative statics may be ill-behaved. I provide plausible examples of this possibility in the context of a di¤erentiated products Cournot oligopoly (Example 3) and market demand with interdependent preferences (Section 7).
In fact, the application in Section 7 helps unify the analysis in Leibenstein (1950) , Rohlfs (1974) and Becker (1991) within a simple two-person model of market demand with interdependent preferences. In another application of the results, I characterize comparative statics in the network game with linear best replies studied in Bramoullé, Kranton, and D'Amours (2014) in terms of a player's degree.
The analysis in this paper contains and extends the results in Dixit (1986) . Corchón (1994) extends Dixit by considering aggregative games where payo¤s depend on other's actions only through the sum. Acemoglu and Jensen (2013) consider a more general class of aggregative games, but one restriction which remains is that the interaction e¤ects of other players on own action must have the same sign. When applied to their respective settings, my results are complementary to theirs. Like this paper, Jinji (2014) considers a general interaction environment. Within the context of oligopoly, Jinji derives conditions under which the equilibrium e¤ect of a unit change in another player's action has the same sign as the private e¤ect. In addition to diagonal dominance, Jinji imposes a condition on certain minors of the Jacobian which is di¢ cult to interpret.
In contrast, the linear conditions on the Jacobian in this paper are simple to check and interpret, and they convey key intuition about the problem. If the system characterizing equilibrium is derived from payo¤ maximization, then with some caveats like interiority, the conditions on the Jacobian translate directly into conditions on the second order derivatives of the objective function. Finally this paper additionally contributes to the literature by linking comparative statics and uniqueness.
A recent strand of the comparative statics literature focuses on environments in which the Implicit Function Theorem cannot be applied. Early contributions to this literature include Topkis (1998), Vives (1990) , and Milgrom and Roberts (1990) who use lattice-based techniques to study monotonicity of equilibrium in games with strategic complements. However, these results apply to only extremal equilibria and the techniques do not extend to other types of strategic interaction. A few results But see Roy and Sabarwal (2010) and Acemoglu and Jensen (2013) for some results in games with strategic substitutes which do not require smoothness. Monaco and Sabarwal (2015) also provide some results which require continuity but not di¤eren-tiability.
One …nal point of distinction from the existing literature is that assumptions in this paper are made directly on the equations of the equilibrium system. This makes the results widely applicable. For example, they apply to reduced form macroeconomic models as well as strategic environments with expected payo¤ maximizers.
In the next section I present the model. The main comparative statics result is in Section 3. I characterize stability in Section 4. In Section 5 I study the relationship between comparative statics and stability, especially in the cases of strategic complements and strategic substitutes. The linear case is considered in Section 6, and Section 7 is devoted to an extended application to demand with interdependent preferences. Uniqueness results appear throughout. Section 8 concludes.
The Environment
Consider a system of n equations in n unknowns: f 1 (x 1 ; x 2 ; :::; x n ; t) = 0 f 2 (x 1 ; x 2 ; :::; x n ; t) = 0 (1) . . .
. . . f n (x 1 ; x 2 ; :::; x n ; t) = 0 where x i 2 X i R for all i are the endogenous variables and t 2 T R s is a vector of exogenous parameters. For the sake of clarity and interpretation, the main body of the paper assumes s = 1, but the results generalize to s …nite. An equilibrium is a vector x = (x 1 ; x 2 ; :::; x n ) that satis…es system (1). Since our interest is in comparative statics, and existence theorems abound for such a system, assume directly that an equilibrium exists. In addition assume 1. f = (f 1 ; f 2 ; :::; f n ) is continuously di¤erentiable at x ; and 2. det(Ã) 6 = 0 at x ; whereÃ is the Jacobian of f:
3.
@f i @x i 6 = 0 for all i at x .
The …rst two assumptions ensure that I can apply the Implicit Function Theorem. The last assumption allows for a convenient normalization ofÃ and is innocuous in many applications.
Let H : R ! R be an increasing and di¤erentiable function, and let (t) P n i=1 x i (t). The main comparative statics results concern how the equilibrium aggregate H( (t)) and the equilibrium x (t) vary with t:
To …x ideas and to help with the exposition of the results, consider two economic models whose equilibrium may be characterized by a system of equations like (1).
Demand for social goods. Suppose n 2 consumers allocate income w i between good X with price p x and good Y with price p y : Consumer i 0 s preferences are represented by the continuously di¤erentiable, strictly quasiconcave utility function u i (x i ; y i ; x i );where x i and y i are consumer i 0 s consumption levels of goods X and Y; while x i = fx 1 ; :::; x i 1 ; x i+1 ; :::; x n g is the vector of others'consumption of good X : In this sense good X is a social good while good Y is a private good.
1
Consumers solve max x i ;y i 2B i u i (x i ; y i ; x i ) ; where B i = f(x i ; y i ) 0 : px i + p y y i w i g is the set of a¤ordable consumption bundles. If demand can be solved explicitly, denote the unique solution to this problem as
i (x i ; p; w i ) and
where f i and h i are consumer i 0 s demand functions for goods X and Y; respectively, given the price vector p = (p x ; p y ), wealth and the consumption of others. Note that f i and h i are continuous at (p; w i ) by the theorem of the maximum.
Focus on the market for the social good. Only pure strategy equilibria exist since x i is unique. Letting w = (w 1 ; w 2 ; :::; w n ) ; an equilibrium demand system given (p; w) is de…ned as x = f (x ; p;w) :
Since every individual's demand is continuous and constrained to B i ; f is continuous and maps a compact and convex set into itself. Therefore, Brouwer's …xed point theorem ensures an equilibrium exists. Formally, in this setting the vector of parameters is t = (p; w): Of primary interest is how the market demand for the social good,
varies with price p x when demand is di¤erentiable at equilibrium and good X is not a Gi¤en good:
0 for all i: When is it possible for market demand to slope upwards in a stable equilibrium? The existing literature on subject, discussed in Section 7, has severely constrained how individual demand depends on others' consumption, typically through the sum of others'consumption. The analysis herein constitutes a substantial generalization.
Di¤erentiated Products Oligopoly. Following Singh and Vives (1984) , the inverse demand for …rm i in a di¤erentiated products oligopoly setting with n …rms engaging in Cournot competition is
b ij (t) x j ; for i = 1; :::; n; where i (t) > 0; b ii (t) > 0; and x j is …rm j 0 s quantity. The interaction terms (b ij ) i6 =j may be negative or positive, depending on whether …rm j has a "business enhancing" or "business stealing" e¤ect on …rm i: Let c i (x i ; t) be …rm i 0 s convex cost function.
Dropping the dependence on t; each …rm's pro…t maximizing quantity
An equilibrium x = (x 1 ; :::; x n ) simultaneously solves all n of these equations.
To provide an example of a linear version of system (1), note that if c i (x i ) = c i x i for c i 0 then …rm i 0 s pro…t maximizing quantity is
x j for i = 1; :::; n: . Then totally di¤erentiating system (1) at equilibrium gives
In a strategic context, the total e¤ect (T E) of a parameter change on individual i 0 s action,
; can be decomposed into the private e¤ect (P E) and the interactions e¤ect (IE): The private e¤ect is P E = describe how player i 0 s action changes in response to a one unit increase in player j 0 s action. Thus, the interactions e¤ect for player i is simply IE = P n j=1;j6 =i
The e¤ect of a parameter change on the equilibrium aggregate H ( ) is
To observe the e¤ect on 
The Main Results
In this section I show that A 2 N ICS if A is a B matrix and A 2 N IRS if A T is a B matrix, where A T denotes the transpose of A: A B matrix is a square matrix whose row means are positive and larger than each of the o¤-diagonal terms of the same row. Denote this class B: Precisely, the n n matrix = ( ij ) is a B matrix if, for i = 1; :::; n;
Carnicer, Goodman, and Peña (1999) show that matrices in this class have a strictly positive determinant (see Corollary 4.5). The term "B matrix"is introduced in Peña (2001) , but a more descriptive moniker may be row mean positive dominant matrices.
The result in Carnicer, Goodman, and Peña (1999) is stated for B-matrices but clearly it extends to any matrix whose transpose T is a B matrix since det( ) = det( T ):
Theorem 1
(a) If A satis…es inequalities (6)-(7), then the equilibrium aggregate H( ) is nondecreasing for any vector of positive private e¤ects. That is, A (x ) 2 B implies
(b) If A T satis…es inequalities (6)-(7), then the following individual level comparative statics hold.
i. x is nondecreasing for uniform positive private e¤ects.
ii. x i is nondecreasing if the private e¤ect is dominant for player i:
(c) If, in addition, X = X 1 X 2 X n is a rectangle and A 2 B for all x or A T 2 B for all x then equilibrium is unique.
These results are notable for at least four reasons. First, they allow for the terms of the Jacobian to take any sign, that is, any type of interaction is allowed. Second, the individual level comparative statics apply to private e¤ects that are dominant for player i; and this contains the set of private e¤ects that hit only player i: Third, the hypotheses are simple to check as they involve only the entries of the Jacobian. Fourth, part (c) establishes an intimate connection between comparative statics and uniqueness.
To generate some intuition for conditions (6)- (7), it is helpful to think of system (1) as a system of best response functions in an n player game on a network where the n players form the nodes. For any tuple (x; t) ;the weighted digraph describing the relation between i and j is given by the coe¢ cient matrix
The o¤ diagonals of this matrix f
is the collection of interaction terms. This matrix has zeros on the main diagonal since an increase in own action does not directly cause a further change in one's action. In this setting conditions (6)- (7) can be interpreted as di¤erent measures of a player's network centrality. Let
if each player's indegree less than one. In other words, the positive net e¤ect of others'actions on a player's own action cannot be to strong.
To interpret condition (7), de…ne player i 0 s maximal relative negative in ‡uence-ability as the maximum negative interaction e¤ect that another player j has on player i; relative to player i 0 s indegree:
This measure of a player's centrality captures two e¤ects. First, it is a measure of how much a player's action decreases with an increase in other's action. This is important since a parameter shock that creates positive private e¤ects may have the opposite sign as the private e¤ect when there are negative interactions. Second, it roughly captures variation in negative interaction. As I illustrate in Example 1 below, this variation also plays an important role in determining whether comparative statics are well-behaved. Matrix A satis…es condition (7), and hence Theorem 1(a) applies, if each player's maximal relative negative in ‡uenceability is less than one.
In order for A T to be a B matrix so that Theorem 1(b) can be applied, each player's outdegree,
; and maximal relative negative in ‡uence,
be less than one. These measures of centrality are analogous to the indegree and maximal relative negative in ‡uenceability, but focus on how a player's action a¤ects others'actions rather than how a player's action is a¤ected by others'actions.
The following example of the market demand for a social good illustrates the approach and assumptions driving the results. 
where the coe¢ cient on the jth private e¤ect is the jth inverse column sum of A: Focus on the …rst inverse column sum. If player 1 decreases consumption by one unit, player 2 decreases consumption by b units but player 3 0 s consumption increases by c units. Moreover, player 2's decrease in consumption causes player 3 to decrease consumption by an additional bd units. Thus,
(1 b c + bd) represents the contribution of player 1's private e¤ect to the slope of market demand after other players fully respond to his change in consumption. One can interpret the remaining column sums in similar fashion.
Whether market demand is downward sloping for any vector of negative private e¤ects clearly depends on the size of the interaction e¤ects of players 1 and 2 on player 3, but it also depends on their variation. To see this, suppose b = 1 2 while c = d = 0:8: Then the …rst inverse column sum is 0:3 and every player's maximal relative negative in ‡uenceability is less than one. But if c and d change to 1:6 and 0; respectively, then the …rst inverse column sum is 0:1 even though the sum of interaction e¤ects c + d remains constant. In this speci…cation player 3's maximal relative negative in ‡uenceability is greater than one.
Case 2. a < 0; b < 0; c = d = 0: In this case player 1 and 2's demand increases with the other's consumption but player 3's demand is independent. Intuition would suggest that market demand is downward sloping, but large feedback e¤ects between players 1 and 2 can reverse the expected comparative statics. By direct computation we have
so that demand may slope upwards if ab > 1: Note that there is no negative in ‡uence, so each player's maximal relative negative in ‡uenceability is zero, but each player's indegree is less than one only if a; b < 1.
Su¢ cient Conditions on the Interaction Terms
While the linear conditions of Theorems 1 are simple to check, it may be useful to have conditions on the interaction terms to facilitate comparison with existing results. The special case of anonymous interaction merits attention as well. Anonymous interaction at x arises if for all i; f for all j 6 = i and interaction is anonymous.
Stability
As Case 2 in Example 1 shows, the equilibrium aggregate may decrease with positive private e¤ects even when all the individual interaction e¤ects are nonnegative. This seems counterintuitive, even disturbing, but comparative statics analysis by way of the Implicit Function Theorem is simply a technique, and the behavioral intuition for these results is typically dynamic. If equilibrium is unstable, the dynamic and static predictions after a parameter shock di¤er; at stable equilibria they are the same. It is therefore interesting to evaluate whether comparative static predictions are robust to dynamic predictions for some reasonable dynamic speci…cation. I use best reply dynamics for this purpose, and in this section I characterize stable equilibria.
The main di¢ culty in analyzing stability in discrete time is that standard results are available for explicitly de…ned systems, but system (1) may be implicitly de…ned. I solve this problem by transforming system (1) locally into an explicitly de…ned system via the Implicit Function Theorem. Once this is accomplished I prove two stability results. One is well-known but I include it for convenience and the second is kind of "folk"stability result for which I have been unable to …nd a reference.
Consider a deviation to x 0 "near" an equilibrium x : Thinking of system (1) a system of implicitly de…ned best response functions, one for each player, assume each player revises his action to best respond to x 0 : Given the vector of actions x(1) which results from this process, players again non-cooperatively revise their action to x(2) to best respond to x(1); and so on. Formally, system 1 can be written as
where x i (k 1) = (x 1 (k 1) ; :::; x i 1 (k 1) ; x i+1 (k 1) ; :::; x n (k 1)) with initial value x(0) = x 0 : Intuitively, in each equation the other players'actions x i (k 1)
are taken as given so that (x i (k 1) ; t) are treated as parameters. Since f i i 6 = 0; by the Implicit Function Theorem there exists a unique function z at (x ; t) such that
If we consider deviations within the open neighborhood around (x ; t) in which equation (10) is valid, we may analyze properties of z directly to determine the local stability of the equilibrium x We need the following notions of stability.
De…nition 1
The equilibrium point x of (10) is:
for all k 0; and unstable if it is not stable. 2. Exponentially stable if there exists > 0; M > 0, and 2 (0; 1) such that
By the Implicit Function Theorem, the Jacobian of system (10) Figure  1 . Feedback e¤ects are present since own consumption indirectly in ‡uences own demand. To see this, suppose that, by mistake, player 3 increases his consumption by one unit. In the next period, player 2 rationally responds by increasing his consumption c units while player 3 corrects his mistake and returns to equilibrium In the following period, player 1 increases his consumption c 2 units while player 2 returns to his equilibrium consumption. In the third period after the deviation, player 3 increases his consumption c 3 units while player 1 returns to equilibrium. In this way, player 3's demand is indirectly a¤ected by own consumption through the demand response of others. In fact, the cycle continues such that the individual whose consumption is not in equilibrium in the nth period after the deviation is c n units away from its equilibrium value. If c < 1 then consumption returns to equilibrium in the limit. If c = 1 the equilibrium is stable to the deviation described but not exponentially stable, and if In particular, say that actions are subject to moderate social in ‡uence at x if kDk < 1 at x; where k:k is any matrix norm induced by a vector norm.
Two especially useful matrix norms in this context are:
(maximum absolute row sum), and
If actions are subject to moderate social in ‡uence under the maximum absolute column sum norm, then there is no individual whose choices a¤ect the actions of others too strongly. Alternatively, if actions are subject to moderate social in ‡uence under the maximum absolute row sum norm, then there are no individuals whose choices are a¤ected too strongly by the actions decisions of others. Note that it is possible that are subject to moderate social in ‡uence under one norm but not the other. However, interactions fail to be moderate under either norm if f 
Comparative Statics and Stability
It is helpful to consider a 3-person example to better understand the relationship between comparative statics and stability. In this case we have
It follows from Theorems 1 and 2 that if for each player the absolute indegree, indegree, and maximal relative in ‡uenceability are moderate, the equilibrium is stable and the equilibrium aggregate is nondecreasing if the private e¤ects are positive. These linear conditions are simple to check. In a three person economy, the absolute indegree for each player is moderate, and hence equilibrium is stable, if Turning to the comparative statics, the equilibrium aggregate is nondecreasing for positive private e¤ects if each player's indegree and maximal relative negative in ‡uenceability is less than one. For player i this requires
The …rst inequality limits player i 0 s indegree while last two limit his relative negative in ‡uenceability. The triangle in Figure 2 with points at (0; 1) ; (1; 0); and ( 1; 1) illustrates the set of interaction terms that satisfy inequalities (13)- (15) . If the interaction terms for all individuals lie within this set then the equilibrium aggregate is nondecreasing. If there is at least one individual for whom the interaction terms are outside of this set the equilibrium aggregate may decrease with positive private e¤ects.
Strategic Complements
By strategic complements I mean that the interaction terms are all nonnegative, This result is an Implicit Function Theorem-based version of the lattice-based result in Echenique (2002) in which it is shown that if equilibrium is not monotone increasing in an exogenous parameter then equilibrium must be unstable under a broad class of adaptive dynamics. 5 My result applies to best reply dynamics, but the payo¤ is an incredibly simple proof of this powerful result. In addition, this approach allows for the new result that equilibrium is unique if (D) < 1 for all x:
The proof follows from the theory of M matrices (e.g., see Bapat and Raghavan, 1997). The n n matrix is called an M -matrix if it can be written = I Y for some nonnegative matrix Y and scalar > (Y ) : One of the many interesting properties of these matrices is that (b) Equilibrium is unique if (D) < 1 for all x and X = X 1 X 2 X n is a rectangle.
In fact, if x is unstable, X i for i = 1; ::; n is convex and compact, and z describes global dynamics, then play converges to a vector x x ( x 6 = x ) after a parameter shock which creates positive private e¤ects. This follows from the monotone convergence theorem since dynamic system (10) generates a monotone increasing sequence
after a parameter shock. In fact, the same result applies under any adaptive dynamic where an individual increases his action if others increase theirs, whether or not players are best responding. In this sense, the comparative statics technique fails to give a satisfactory prediction of behavior at unstable equilibria. I give a simple graphical example of this result in the context of the market demand for social goods in Section 7.
Suppose z is continuous in addition to describing global dynamics. Then x is an equilibrium if x is an unstable interior equilibrium:
A similar argument establishes the existence of a second equilibriumx x (x 6 = x ) to which x k 1 0 converges if the parameter shock causes a negative private e¤ect. In other words, the existence of an unstable interior equilibrium implies the existence of a lower and higher equilibrium.
Strategic Substitutes
By strategic substitutes I mean that all the interaction terms are nonpositive, or 
:
As suggested by the lower left quadrant of Figure 2 , the results in this section demonstrate that well-behaved comparative statics are more likely to arise when interaction e¤ects are limited in size and variation. The intuition behind limiting the size of negative interaction e¤ects is obvious, so let me focus on the intuition for why heterogenous interaction terms can lead to a decrease in the equilibrium aggregate. Note that this situation is represented in the lower left quadrant of Figure 2 by the area formed by the two triangles inside the stability line but outside the cone of well-behaved comparative statics.
To take an example from the demand for social goods, consider recreational activities subject to congestion like downhill skiing or sur…ng. In each instance, the location, a ski resort or a beach that generates reliable waves, is …xed in the short run. Assume the marginal utility of the activity for any skier or surfer is decreasing with congestion. Additional participants means one is more likely to be in a collision, to have more di¢ culty in skiing a clean run or catching a good wave, and the interval between runs or rides is longer because of congestion at the lift or line-up. However, skilled participants may generate smaller externalities since these participants are more knowledgeable of etiquette and less likely to interfere with one's enjoyment of the activity. If willingness to pay for the activity is positively related with skill, which is not an unreasonable assumption since skilled participants likely obtained their skill from repetition, then skilled participants may be willing to pay more to be among a greater quantity of skilled participants rather than a lesser quantity of unskilled participants. Thus, a ski resort may be able to charge a higher price and attract more skiers if it can select for more highly skilled skiers. This may explain why resorts with more di¢ cult trails are higher priced and more crowded than equally sized, nearby resorts with easier trails.
This example does not apply well to all congestion situations. Probably the most reasonable assumption for tra¢ c congestion is anonymous e¤ects since in the vast majority of cases each additional vehicle creates same negative externality. In this case the demand curve is downward sloping. That being said, it may be possible for toll operators to select for better drivers, and consequently face a less elastic demand curve, by selling passes only to those who have good driving records.
Turning to the results, note that under strategic substitutes each player's indegree and outdegree is negative. Thus the following corollary gives su¢ cient conditions under which the maximal relative negative in ‡uence and in ‡uenceability of each player is moderate. X n is a rectangle, then equilibrium is unique.
Proof. (a) This is a special case of Corollary 2. (b) A is an inverse M matrix by Theorem 3 in Johnson and Smith (2007). (c) A is a strictly ultrametric matrix. (d) This follows immediately from the proof of Theorem 3(c) and the fact that any
inverse M matrix is a P matrix (Horn and Johnson, 2001 ). Notice that the individual level comparative statics apply under weaker conditions when greater homogeneity is imposed. Starting with arbitrary interactions, then anonymous interaction or strategic substitutes, then strategic substitutes and anonymous interaction, and …nally strategic substitutes and identical interaction effects, the su¢ cient conditions on the interaction terms for well-behaved comparative statics are, for n 3;
These results considerably generalize Dixit (1986) who considers an environment with strategic substitutes and anonymous interaction. In addition to some other conditions, Dixit shows that strict row diagonal dominance of A is su¢ cient for x i to increase with positive private e¤ects that hits only player i: Recall that strict row diagonal dominance requires that the diagonal entry of each row be strictly greater than the absolute sum of its o¤ diagonal entries. In other words kDk 1 < 1: With anonymous interaction e¤ects, Dixit's su¢ cient condition becomes c i <
My results show that this condition is su¢ cient in an environment with either anonymous interaction or strategic substitutes, and in both cases apply to positive private e¤ects that are dominant for player i: The fact that anonymous interaction is unnecessary is especially notable. In justifying the product homogeneity assumption, Dixit writes (p. 119) that under heterogeneity, "in each row the o¤-diagonal elements would all be di¤erent, and the matrix would be just the general n-by-n matrix. No structure could be imposed on its inverse, and no meaningful results could emerge." Moreover, under the same hypotheses and parameter shocks as Dixit I am able to relax his condition to c i <
for all i (Theorem 4(b) ). Moreover, in contrast to the 1 1 n condition, Theorem 4(c) covers the textbook case of homogeneous product oligopoly where b ij = b for all i; j 2 f1; :::; ng in equation (2) .
The …nal result of this section generalizes Dixit (1986) in a di¤erent direction by showing that strict diagonal dominance yields well-behaved comparative statics even without anonymous interaction. Loosely speaking, the equilibrium aggregate increases with positive private e¤ect if there is no one person who "spoils the fun for everyone"in that an increase in their action causes a cumulatively large negative e¤ect on others actions.
Thus, such a "spoiler" is a necessary condition for illbehaved comparative statics. Moreover, well-behaved individual level comparative statics arise as long as no one is too much of a "snob" whose action is su¢ ciently negatively in ‡uenced by a one unit increase in all others'actions.
Interestingly, the proof of this result relies only on simple algebra and the wellknown Neumann expansion. This illustrates one of the bene…ts of studying stability in discrete time versus continuous time as in Dixit (1986).
Theorem 5 Suppose there are strategic substitutes at x : (a) If kD (x )k 1 < 1; then equilibrium is exponentially stable and the equilibrium aggregate is nondecreasing with positive private e¤ects.
(b) If kD (x )k 1 < 1; then equilibrium is exponentially stable and (i) x is nondecreasing for uniform positive private e¤ects, and (ii) x i is nondecreasing for a positive private e¤ect that hits only player i:
(c) If for all i; X i is convex, f i is monotone in x i , and kDk 1 < 1 for all x or kDk 1 < 1 for all x then equilibrium is unique.
Linear Systems
In this section I brie ‡y investigate the case where system (1) is linear. That is, we can write
ij (t)x j for i > 0 and i = 1; :::; n:
In this setting, f i j =f i i = ij . Several models fall into this class including the Cournot di¤erentiated oligopoly with linear costs model from equation (3), and the linear quadratic payo¤ functions studied in Ballester, Calvó, and Zenou (2006). Bramoullé, Kranton, and D'Amours (2014) (hereafter BKD) study the case where i (t) = 1 for all i, ij (t) = g ij for g ij f0; 1g and > 0; and g ij = g ji :
BKD show that the sum of equilibrium actions is increasing in in any stable equilibrium. They do not provide results for the individual level and their proof relies on maximizing behavior as well as on the potential game structure. Theorem 5 provides similar comparative statics results on the equilibrium aggregate and individual level actions without such assumptions.
One can also use Theorem 5 to characterize comparative statics in the BKD framework in terms of a player's degree, where the degree d (i) of player i is the number of links the player has in a network, or d (i) = P j g ij : BKD restrict actions to be nonnegative, and a player is active if his equilibrium action is strictly positive, and inactive if his equilibrium action equals zero. Let d A (j) = P i g A ij be the degree of player j to active agents, where g ) if @t > 0 is uniform, and sgn(
Proof. The result follows from the fact that x i = P n j=1 a 1 1j
and dt i = P n j=1 a 1 1j
@t:
Let us apply this result to the BKD framework. A degree uniform network is a network where each player has the same degree, d (i) = d for all i:
7 Theorem 6 implies that for any positive symmetric equilibrium 8 in a degree uniform network, x is decreasing in :
Corollary 4 Consider the BKD framework for a degree uniform network. Then for any positive, symmetric equilibrium, x is decreasing in :
Proof.
for all i and any k; where the penultimate equality follows from symmetry and the last equality follows from the fact that the network is degree uniform. Therefore, an increase in represents a uniform negative shock, and the result follows from a minor modi…cation of the proof of Theorem 6.
To conclude this section, I provide a cautionary example of a stable, symmetric equilibrium where the unique solution is decreasing with a uniform positive private e¤ects. From a technical point of view, the example demonstrates the need for the assumption i = for all i in Theorem 6. Example 3. Consider the di¤erentiated products oligopoly environment from Section 2. The linear case …ts into the BKD framework and is a degree uniform network. Suppose there are 3 …rms with c i (x i ) = 20x i for all i. The inverse demand functions are p 1 = 300 x 1 :4x 2 :4x 3 p 2 = 560 3x 1 x 2 :4x 3 p 3 = 560 3x 1 :4x 2 x 3 7 One important example of a degree unifrom network is a complete bipartite graph where the set of nodes is partitioned into two subsets of equal size. Another example is interaction on a circle where each agent interacts with his nearest d=2 neighbors. In fact any static game where each player interacts with every other player may be thought of as a degree uniform network. 8 That is, x i = x j > 0 for all i; j:
The unique equilibrium is (x 1 ; x 2 ; x 3 ) = (100; 100; 100) and the corresponding prices are (p 1 ; p 2 ; p 3 ) = (120; 120; 120) Constructing matrix D from the system ( Equilibrium is stable since (D) 0:85:
In an e¤ort to stimulate the industry, suppose the government provides a uniform subsidy of s = 20 per unit for each …rm so that the marginal cost of each …rm net of the subsidy is zero. The new equilibrium is (x 1 ; x 2 ; x 3 ) = 113 ; 91 2 3 . Not only does the output of …rms 2 and 3 decrease with the subsidy, but industry output also falls from 300 to 296 2 3 : This is somewhat surprising since the …rms have identical costs and …rms have the same quantities, prices, and pro…ts in equilibrium. Without information about the underlying demand curves, the initial equilibrium is indistinguishable from a 3 …rm Cournot oligopoly with homogeneous products. Hence, one might expect that a uniform subsidy would increase the output of all …rms.
The intuition is as follows. A subsidy directly increases the pro…tability of the next unit by lowering production costs. This is the private e¤ect of the subsidy. An increase in a …rm's output, however, has a business stealing e¤ect on other …rms in the industry, which is the interactions e¤ect of the subsidy.
When products are homogeneous, the business stealing e¤ect is symmetric so that each …rm's output increases. In this example, however, the business stealing e¤ect is much stronger for …rm 1. The lower production costs allow …rm 1 to steal enough business from …rms 2 and 3 that the latter …rms'output decreases with the subsidy.
Application to the Demand for Social Goods
"Almost the whole value of strawberries in March...is the fact that others cannot get them." Henry Cunynghame, 1892 "When a royal personage condemns a barbarous fashion, the osprey yields to arti…cial ‡owers." A.C. Pigou, 1913 Classical demand theory assumes preferences are independent. However, ever since Marshall's Principles in 1890, economists have recognized that others's consumption can in ‡uence own demand in important ways. 9 The formal literature on the shape of market demand in this case has bene…tted from the development of game theory, but systematic analysis of market demand with interdependent preferences remains scarce 10 . Basic results are repeated and often rely on strong assumptions on the nature of the interdependence. In this section I use the insights from the paper to unify and clarify some results from the literature. Leibenstein (1950) may be considered one of the …rst formal analyses of social markets. He considered the case of strategic complements (i.e., bandwagon e¤ects) and strategic substitutes (i.e., snob e¤ects). While Leibenstein argued that market demand should be downward sloping even when these e¤ects exist, it is well known that demand in social markets may be upward sloping (e.g., Katz and Speigel, 1996; Rohlfs, 1974; Becker, 1991; Becker and Murphy, 2000) . The typical intuition is simple. In the case of strategic complements, at a given price, some consumers may choose not to consume a good until it attracts a critical mass of consumers. This leads to multiple equilibria which necessitates upward sloping demand if demand is continuous and not horizontal. In the case of strategic substitutes, some individuals refuse to consume a good unless prices are high, because only then does the product become exclusive as other consumers drop out of the market.
Strategic Complements
The most abundant models of interdependent preferences deal with the case of strategic complements. The demand curves which appear in Leibenstein (1950) , Rohlfs (1974) and Becker (1991) are special cases of this model. The di¤erence between them lies in the degree to which social interactions in ‡uence individual demand. To be speci…c, when there are strategic complements call good X a purely social good at In this case, good X is on the margin of the class of quasi social goods. The zero equilibrium exists, but there is also a unique positive equilibrium which is easy to obtain:
One can verify that x i is decreasing in price for i = 1; 2, which implies x is an exponentially stable equilibrium by Theorem 3. In addition, demand is increasing in own and others'wealth, and increasing in 1 and 2 :
Good X is a quasi social good for both individuals. There exists a unique, exponentially stable equilibrium as illustrated in Figure 3 ; best reply dynamics from a deviation to D 1 lead back to A: Moreover, equilibrium has the same comparative statics as Case 1. To see this, note that player 1 0 s demand curve shifts down when p x increases, or w 1 or 1 decrease. Similarly, player 2's demand curve shifts to the left when p x decreases, or w 2 or 2 decrease. The market demand curve is downward sloping everywhere, as illustrated in Figure 3 .b. This market demand curve is consistent with Leibenstein (1950) .
In this case good X is a purely social good. The zero equilibrium always exists, and there may be zero, one, or two positive equilibria. Figure 4 .a illustrates the case of two positive equilibria. Note that the equilibrium B is unstable and corresponds to an upward sloping section of market demand.
Consider the e¤ect of an increase in price on the equilibrium at B: Player 1's demand curve shifts down while player 2's shifts left. The equilibrium locally shifts to B 0 which reverses the expected comparative statics with respect to p; ; and w. leads the economy to the zero equilibrium from B: In other words, an increase in price at equilibrium B causes consumption to collapse to zero. This is consistent with the discussion after Theorem 3. In general, the market demand curve has an inverted U shape (Figure 4 .b). The equilibria to the left of the demand curve's peak are unstable whereas the equilibria to the right are stable. This is the same type of demand curve which arises in Rohlfs' (1974) application. Case 4 1 < 0 and a 2 > 0:
In this case, good X is quasi social for player 2 but purely social for player 1. Market demand may be downward sloping with a single equilibrium at high prices, multiple equilibria at intermediate prices, and then a single equilibrium at low prices where demand is downward sloping. This is illustrated in Figure 5 . At low prices like p 1 ; player 2's consumption is su¢ ciently high at all levels of x 1 to induce player 1 to also consume. In this case equilibrium is unique and corresponds to point A in Figure 5 .
At intermediate prices like p 2 ; player 2's consumption when x 1 = 0 is not su¢ cient to induce player 1 to purchase the good. This is represented by point D. However, at higher levels of x 2 ; player 1 would consume a positive amount. Two possible equilibria are represented by points B and C: At p 2 ; B and D are exponentially stable, but C is unstable. At even higher prices (not pictured), only player 2 consumes the good, but it is never enough to induce player 1 to purchase the good. As noted in Becker (1991), this type of demand curve can help explain why the popularity of restaurants or bands can appear random. There are "hard core"fans like player 2 but also casual fans like player 1 who like the band only when it is popular. These examples illustrate that when strategic complements exist, upward sloping demand should be interpreted as an increase in consumers' willingness to pay as consumption increases, rather than a situation in which sellers can increase the price and sell more. In fact, an increase in price at upward sloping points on the demand curve could cause demand to collapse. Upward sloping demand opens the possibility to a situation where there is a stable equilibrium with a higher price and quantity than an alternative equilibrium.
Strategic Substitutes
Strategic substitutes give rise to the possibility of stable, upward sloping demand. To illustrate, suppose f 1 2 < 0 but f 2 1 = 0: Since there are no feedback e¤ects any equilibrium is stable. Figure 6 .a illustrates a situation in which player 1's demand is decreasing and convex in player 2's consumption. When price increases from p 1 to p 2 ; the private e¤ect decreases consumption for both individuals:
for all x 1 and f 1 (p 2 ; x 2 ) < f 1 (p 1 ; x 2 ) for all x 2 : However, the interactions e¤ect on player 1's consumption counteracts and in fact overwhelms the private e¤ect:
This e¤ect is so strong that total quantity demanded increases. This is illustrated in panel a since B is above the 45-degree line running through A: Note that a necessary condition for market quantity to increase with price is that f 1 2 < 1 for some x 2 between f 2 (x 1 ; p 1 ) and f 2 (x 1 ; p 2 ) :
At prices well above p 2 ; the market demand curve in panel b illustrates the situation where player 2's demand falls to zero so that only player 1 is in the market. At prices su¢ ciently below p 1 ; the marginal external consumption e¤ect of player 2 on player 1's demand is small enough so that market demand is again downward sloping.
The interesting observation here is that an increase in price in the upward sloping region of market demand will increase quantity demanded. This is consistent with the situation in which a rich snob's demand is increasing in price because higher prices force poor people out of the market towards substitutes. However, upward sloping demand can result even if the two individuals have the same wealth. For example, the "snob" may have a strong preference for the social good with a strong interactions e¤ect while the other person only consumes a signi…cant amount when the price is low.
Conclusion
This paper characterizes comparative statics of the equilibrium aggregate under for positive parameter shocks, and characterizes the comparative statics for the individual equilibrium action for uniform positive shocks as well as shocks that are dominant for an individual. Interactions are allowed to take any form. Even at this level of generality, the simple linear conditions on the interaction terms ensure that equilibrium is stable and that the equilibrium aggregate and individual equilibrium action increase with these parameter shocks. If the linear conditions apply globally, equilibrium is unique. In the context of a game on a …xed network, these linear conditions are interpreted as each player having moderate centrality in the underlying network.
An important takeaway is that in a stable equilibrium the equilibrium aggregate and individual equilibrium actions may decrease under these parameter shocks only if (i) an increase in some player's action causes at least one other player to decrease their action, and (ii) interaction e¤ects are heterogeneous. In short, heterogeneity matters. If strategic substitutes exist, then there also must be one "spoiler" whose action has a strong cumulative e¤ect on others'action for the equilibrium aggregate to decrease, and there must be a "snob"whose action strongly is in ‡uenced by others' actions for the individual level equilibrium action to decrease. (c) x is a …xed point of f if and only if it is a …xed point of dynamic system (9) . A …xed point is unique if it is globally asymptotically stable, so the result is a consequence of Lemma 3 in Christensen and Jung (2012).
Lemma 2 Let X be an n n matrix with nonnegative column sums. Let Y 0 be an n n nonnegative matrix. Then W = XY has nonnegative column sums. If X has at least one positive column sum and Y > 0; then W = XY has at least one positive column sum.
Proof. Let X = (x ij ) ; Y = (y ij ) and W = (w ij ) : Since the column sums of X are nonnegative P n i=1 x ik 0; and Y is nonnegative, the jth column sum of W is
The last inequality is strict if P n i=1 x ik > 0 and Y > 0: Proof of Corollary 3. Order system (1) such that the …rst n A rows are the best reply functions of the n A active agents. The remaining n I equations for the inactive agents are x i = 0 in equilibrium. Then D can be partitioned as 
